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ABSTRACT 
One way or another, the European Monetary Union (“EMU”) is 
apt to endure.  The prospect of continuation under the precise 
contours of the regime as we presently find it, however, is 
anything but certain.  Hence many investors and other actual or 
prospective contract parties are likely to remain skittish until 
matters grow clearer. 
This skittishness, importantly, can itself hamper the prospect of 
expeditious European recovery.  Addressing particular sources of 
ongoing uncertainty about EMU prospects can itself therefore aid 
in the project of recovery.  This Essay accordingly aims to impose 
structure upon one particular, and indeed particularly complex, 
source of uncertainty now damaging EMU prospects.  That is the 
matter of how best to defend, legally speaking, continuity of 
contract in the event of some basic change in the current Euro 
regime. 
The hope is that sizing up and breaking down this question 
into its constituent parts might accomplish at least three related 
aims.  One is to render the hypothetical problems raised by the 
question more tractable than they would otherwise be.  Another is 
to facilitate the development of provisional plans of approach to 
such problems in the event they should present themselves.  
Finally, yet another is to afford confidence to the markets by 
enabling contingency planning of the sort just suggested, thereby 
lessening the likelihood of self-fulfilling ‘run’-like activity on 
European debt instruments. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: ADDRESSING THE HYPOTHETICAL TO KEEP IT 
HYPOTHETICAL 
One way or another, the European Monetary Union (“EMU”) is 
apt to endure.1  The sunk costs, future stakes, and prospective price 
of failure are simply too high to permit disunion to become truly 
thinkable to most current members.  The prospect of continuation 
under the precise contours of the regime as we presently find it, 
however, is anything but certain.2  Hence, many investors and 
other actual or prospective contract parties are likely to remain 
skittish until matters grow clearer. 
This skittishness, importantly, can itself hamper the prospect of 
full and expeditious European recovery.  Addressing particular 
sources of ongoing uncertainty about EMU prospects can itself 
therefore aid in the project of recovery.  In that light, I hope here to 
impose a bit of structure upon one particular, and indeed 
particularly complex, source of uncertainty now damaging EMU 
prospects.  That is the matter of how best to defend, legally 
speaking, continuity of contract in the event of some basic change 
in the current Euro regime. 
My hope is that sizing up and breaking down this question into 
its constituent parts might accomplish at least three related aims.  
One is to render the hypothetical problems raised by the question 
at least somewhat more tractable than they appear presently to be.  
Another is to facilitate the development of provisional plans of 
                                                     
1 Much has been written over the past several years about the possibility, 
desirability, and undesirability of partial or full EMU dissolution.  In the interest 
of brevity, I shall cite only my own two most recent interventions in the 
discussion.  See Robert Hockett, Save Europe’s Marriage with a Trial Separation, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS (June 12, 2012, 6:30 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
2012-06-12/save-europe-s-marriage-with-a-trial-separation.html (suggesting that 
a possible solution to save the eurozone might be to spend some time apart and 
experiment with other currencies and central banks until all parties reach a 
sufficient level of maturity to be in a relationship); Robert Hockett, Five Angry 
Elephants, BENZINGA FINANCIAL NEWS (Mar. 14, 2012, 5:19 PM), 
http://www.benzinga.com/general/topics/12/03/2424391/five-angry-
elephants (arguing that unless and until global distributive and currency 
dysfunctions are addressed, Europe and the global economy at large are at great 
risk of failure).  
2 My own guess would be that a temporary two-tiered Euro arrangement 
will prove most workable and attractive in the near future.  See Hockett, Save 
Europe’s Marriage with a Trial Separation, supra note 1. 
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approach to such problems in the event they should ultimately 
indeed present themselves.  Finally, yet another is to afford 
confidence to the markets by enabling contingency planning of the 
sort just suggested, thereby lessening the likelihood of self-
fulfilling ‘run’-like activity on European debt instruments. 
The project is indeed complex.  It also turns out, however, to be 
more or less tractable.  The principal challenge is in deciding how 
best to order the presentation with a view to rendering the analysis 
as immediately graspable by intuition as possible.  What has come 
to seem best to me in this connection is to structure the 
presentation principally by reference to three fundamental 
‘dimensions,’ or ‘layers,’ of complexity.  Additional sources of 
complexity, seemingly less ‘fundamental’ even if numerous and 
important, can then be folded-in in a more or less ad hoc manner at 
minimal frustration to intuition. 
That, then, is the plan I adopt for what follows.  Section 2 lays 
out the advertised ‘fundamental layers.’  Section 3 then notes 
several additional layers of complexity that are less fundamental 
and accordingly best dealt with in ad hoc fashion.  Section 4 then 
analyzes the contract continuity question across layers by reference 
to several non-fanciful hypothetical situations in which contract 
continuity would be implicated. 
Section 5 briefly addresses an additional complexity that some 
might believe to be introduced by 1997 Amendments made to the 
New York General Obligations Law, to which many Euro-
denominated financial contracts are subject.  Section 6 then 
concludes and looks forward.  An Appendix reduces the analyses 
of Sections 4 and 5 to readily intuited ‘flowchart’ form. 
2. LAYERS OF FUNDAMENTAL COMPLEXITY 
We begin with the first two layers of fundamental complexity, 
which probably deserve most attention because they are least 
immediately familiar.  First, there appear to be two distinct regime-
change (“Regime Change”) scenarios to consider—viz., partial and 
full dissolution of the EMU.  Second, there appear to be two 
contractual performance-impediment (“Performance 
Impediment”) scenarios to consider—viz., those that give rise to 
colorable impracticability excuses of performance on the one hand, 
and those that give rise to colorable impossibility excuses of 
performance on the other hand. 
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These various Regime Change and Performance Impediment 
scenarios are cross-cutting, precisely because they are situated on 
distinct ‘dimensions.’  Each alternative upon one dimension, in 
other words, can be paired with either alternative on the other 
dimension.  Hence there are four possible combinations of 
combined Regime Change and Performance Impediment scenarios.  I’ll 
assign italicized Roman numerals I and II to the Change scenarios 
and italicized alphabet letters A and B to the Impediment scenarios.  
Our possible combinations then will be IA, IB, IIA, and IIB. 
Turning next to the third layer of fundamental complexity, 
which comprises various “Venue” scenarios, as I’ll call them: this 
one enters the picture in virtue of the existence of multiple 
jurisdictions in which a contract action might be brought in 
response to some breach stemming from Scenarios IA, IB, IIA, or 
IIB. 
Happily, as it turns out, this multiplicity can itself be more or 
less safely reduced, like those in connection with Regime Change 
and Performance Impediment, to a factor of two.  For the principal 
distinction that matters turns out to be that between courts of a 
nation that has left the EMU, on the one hand, and all other courts 
on the other hand.3  I’ll accordingly employ italicized Hindu-
Arabic numerals for tracking purposes in this case and distinguish 
between what I’ll call scenarios “1” and “2” along this Venue 
dimension of complexity—1 for suits brought in courts of a 
particular nation that has exited the EMU, and 2 for suits brought 
elsewhere. 
Summing up, all of the foregoing entails that we now have 
eight possible combinations of Regime Change, Performance 
Impediment, and Venue scenarios to consider: IA1, IA2, IB1, IB2, 
IIA1, IIA2, IIB1, and IIB2. 
3. ADDITIONAL LAYERS OF COMPLEXITY 
As mentioned in the Introduction, there are, alas, several more 
complexities that arise in connection with all of this.  One, for 
example, is occasioned by variation in respect of the new currency 
                                                     
3 This turns out to be so, in turn, because the courts of a nation that has left 
the EMU will ignore the distinction between Impediment Scenarios A and B, 
while other courts for their part will either follow courts of the former sort, or 
resort to more or less identical doctrines—some version of impracticability or 
impossibility doctrine—in connection with each such Impediment Scenario. 
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regime—fixed?, adjustably pegged?, floating?,—that a nation 
exiting the EMU might adopt.4  And these of course bear upon all 
sorts of eventualities that might affect contract performance and 
thus implicate our Contract Continuity problem. 
But since (a) three dimensions—and thus eight combinations!—
already are plenty to track, while (b) the same dimensions suffice 
more or less to accommodate the basic structure of our analysis, 
and (c) the additional complexities seem a bit less ‘fundamental’ in 
any event, I’ll simply fold those in where they turn out to be 
salient. 
Before now turning to the analysis, it might be helpful first 
quickly to summarize the proverbial “bottom line.”  Unfortunately 
that is not easy to do in prose without quickly becoming 
incomprehensible, at least prior to running through the analysis 
itself.  What I shall do instead, then, is simply to direct your 
attention to a flowchart I append to the end, which in a compact 
manner summarizes all that is about to follow. 
And now off to the races. 
4. ANALYSIS ACROSS LAYERS 
Please recall first that there are two Regime Change scenarios to 
consider: 
I. Regime Change Scenario I (Exit by One or More EMU 
Members): One or more countries exits EMU.  Others 
remain.  (EMU, in other words, persists, but has lost at least 
one of its erstwhile members.) 
II. Regime Change Scenario II (Dissolution): EMU dissolves 
altogether. 
Now begin with Regime Change Scenario I (Exit by One or More 
EMU Members): How might contractual continuity come to be 
implicated?  Here is what would seem a prototypical 
                                                     
4 A fixed exchange rate regime establishes specific relative valuations, or 
narrow bands of the same, among participating currencies.  Monetary authorities 
are then obliged to maintain these valuations—typically by trading in foreign 
currency markets so as to affect relative demand for, hence the relative prices of, 
relevant currencies.  An adjustable peg regime is one pursuant to which fixed 
exchange rates are periodically adjusted pursuant to consensual decision-making 
by relevant monetary authorities.  Finally, a floating exchange rate regime simply 
permits decentralized trading activity on the part of private market actors to 
determine the relative values of currencies. 
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hypothetical—“the Hypothetical.”  I’ll lay it out by reference first 
to a particular change (“the Change”) that amounts to an instance 
of the Regime Change I scenario, then to a typical plaintiff (“the 
Plaintiff”) and defendant (“the Defendant”), whose contractual 
relation might be affected by the change. 
4.1.   First Hypothetical 
4.1.1.  The Change 
Assume first that—oh, I don’t know—Greece exits the EMU.  It 
replaces the Euro with, say, a new or revived national currency, the 
NeoDrachma (“NeoD”).  It stipulates some initial NeoD/Euro 
exchange rate and formally redenominates all pre-existing 
contracts bearing some nexus to Greece—e.g., Greek sovereign 
bonds, loans to Greek nationals, etc.—in NeoD.  Call this “the 
Change”.  Something like this Change would seem to be requisite 
to contractual continuity’s being so much as implicated under 
Regime Change Scenario I. 
Next, note that Greece might adopt any of several policies with 
respect to the post-Change NeoD/Euro exchange rate.  (So here’s 
another layer of complexity, but I’m not numbering or lettering, 
just folding it in so as to avoid an unwieldy number of 
‘fundamental dimensions’): 
First, Greece might undertake to maintain the initially 
stipulated exchange rate indefinitely, effectively pegging the NeoD 
to the Euro.  This seems unlikely unless Greece intends that the peg 
be adjustable, more on which prospect below.  For adopting a 
nonadjustable peg would allow Greece, at most, one devaluation 
relative to the Euro—namely, the one conducted via the initially 
stipulated exchange rate.  And presumably a wish for sufficient 
monetary policy autonomy as to permit repeated periodic de- 
and/or revaluations would be among those considerations 
prompting the Change in the first place. 
A second prospect seems nearly as unlikely: That would be 
Greece’s aiming to permit a free float of its currency on the foreign 
exchange (“ForEx”) markets.  This seems unlikely in light of the 
new NeoD’s likely vulnerability, at least early on, to speculative 
attack on global markets. 
More likely, then, Greece will aim to operate with, third, an 
adjustable peg, or fourth, a managed float on the ForEx markets.  
Either policy will presumably be conducted by its central bank—
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the Bank of Greece, or “BG” (which is not to be confused with the 
Australian singing group of the 1970s). 
Now, if Greece maintains a nonadjustable peg—again, 
unlikely—it will surely have to employ strict capital controls as 
well.  Some slightly more relaxed form of capital control or 
regulation, variably strict depending on events in the global capital 
and ForEx markets, also will presumably be necessary in 
connection with an adjustable peg or a managed float.  Since 
adjustable peg or managed float seem more likely, per the 
considerations adduced just above, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that there will be at least some degree of capital control exercised 
by Greece under the new regime. 
In any event, which of these strategies is selected, and how 
successfully it is implemented if it be something other than free 
float, will certainly bear upon subsequent possible litigation, in 
manners to be noted below. 
4.1.2.   The Plaintiff and Defendant 
Next, per our Hypothetical, we’ll assume that—oh, I don’t 
know—a German national is owed a contractual debt by the Greek 
Treasury or by a Greek national.  The contract denominates the 
debt in Euro, and the German national prefers to be paid in Euro 
per the terms of the original contract. 
In such case, if the Greek Treasury or our Greek national has 
traded in Euros for NeoD at the initially stipulated exchange rate, 
if that rate has not since changed, and if the Bank of Greece retains 
Euro reserves and is willing to exchange Euro for Drachma with 
the Greek Treasury or Greek national for purposes of facilitating 
transactions between the latter and Germans, then we need have 
no contractual continuity problem.  The Greek Treasury or Greek 
national might simply purchase Euro from the BG with NeoD and 
pay the German national in Euro.  On the other hand . . . 
If and only if one of the following occur, however, the Greek 
Treasury or our Greek national might well encounter difficulty in 
performing on the contract with Euros rather than NeoD, even if 
they wish to do so.  The legal significance that the difficulty carries 
will ride upon which actually occurs.  As for the latter, as noted 
above, there seem to be two basic possibilities—two Performance 
Impediment scenarios—to consider: 
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 4.1.2.1.  Impediment Scenario A (Colorable Impracticability) 
We assume that Greece has allowed the NeoD to float, either 
freely or in managed fashion, or it maintains an adjustable peg 
which has indeed now been adjusted.  Assume either way that the 
consequence is that the NeoD now is worth much less relative to 
Euro than it was at the time of the Change. 
We’ll assume that the Greek Treasury or Greek national may 
still purchase Euro from Bank of Greece or on the ForEx market—
no capital controls sufficiently onerous as to prevent or prohibit 
this—but at very high NeoD cost.  This will invite—though not 
guarantee, as we’ll see—invocation of the commercial impracticability 
excuse of contractual performance by our Greek defendant should 
the German national sue for payment in Euro, per terms of the 
contract, in court—particularly in non-Greek court.5 
4.1.2.2.  Impediment Scenario B (Colorable Impossibility) 
We shall assume that Greece maintains strict or adjustable peg, 
or manages float, and to facilitate pursuit of that policy also 
imposes capital controls.  Controls are such, in turn, as to prevent 
ready purchase of Euro with NeoD. 
If such purchase is simply rendered more difficult than it 
otherwise would have been, but is not rendered illegal or 
otherwise literally impossible, then again we are looking at a 
prospective impracticability excuse of performance, as in Impediment 
Scenario A just above.  If, on the other hand, capital controls are 
such as actually to render purchase of Euro with NeoD illegal or 
literally impossible, then this will invite—though not guarantee, as 
we’ll see—invocation of impossibility excuse of contractual 
performance should German national demand payment in Euro, 
per terms of the contract, in court—particularly non-Greek court.6  
All right.  Finally, proceeding to our final dimension of 
variation within the context of this Hypothetical, assume that our 
German plaintiff sues our Greek defendant on the contract, seeking 
payment in Euros, not NeoD.  There are then two more scenarios—
Venue scenarios—to consider: 
                                                     
5 As we will see below, in Greek court the defendant is not likely to be found 
even to be in breech if s/he pays in NeoD, though this isn’t quite certain. 
6 See Hockett, Save Europe’s Marriage with a Trial Separation, supra note 1; see 
also text accompanying note 2, supra. 
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4.1.2.3.  Venue Scenario 1 (Action Brought in Greek Court) 
Let us assume that the contract action is brought in Greek 
court.  In this case the redenomination is likely to be fully 
recognized, inasmuch as Greek courts apply Greek law.  
Obligations accordingly held dischargeable in NeoD, presumably 
in amounts determined by the legislated exchange rate.  Court 
holds that Greek defendant may pay German plaintiff in NeoD.  
(Note that the difference between Impediment Scenarios A and B is 
accordingly irrelevant here.  Combinations IA1 and IB1 effectively 
collapse into one.) 
Presumably, however, plaintiff now will hope to appeal to 
some higher court within Greek, EU, or global legal systems, 
perhaps challenging the legislation itself on constitutional or 
cognate treaty grounds insofar as it impairs preexisting contractual 
obligations.  (More on this prospect later.) 
 
4.1.2.4.  Venue Scenario 2 (Action Brought in Non-Greek Court) 
Now we assume that the contract action is brought in a non-
Greek—e.g., a New York court.  In this case the court will embark 
upon a multi-step analysis: 
4.1.2.4.1.  Lex Monetae 
First, analysis will commence with an attempt to determine the 
lex monetae—the law of the sovereign that issues the currency 
named in the contract.  The reason for this is that that law, per the 
state theory of money that all nations (including the United States) 
appear to uphold, will determine what counts as tender in discharge 
of an obligation denominated in the currency issued by that 
sovereign.  And this is so notwithstanding any depreciation on the 
part of some newly issued currency relative to whichever currency it 
replaces.  It is likewise so notwithstanding any other body of law 
named in the contract (i.e., any law of the contract, per ii, below).  In 
other words, the lex monetae, effectively implicated straightaway by 
the contract’s naming a currency at all, supervenes upon any 
additional lex named in the contract. 
A potentially vexing question can arise here, however, 
depending on whether Greece and the EU/EMU agree or disagree 
on the terms of Greece’s exit from the EMU.  Hence we have yet 
another layer of complexity here, but again I am simply folding 
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this one in to avoid an unwieldy number of ‘fundamental 
dimensions’ pursuant to which I structure our analysis. 
So, first, were Greece to leave the EMU pursuant to some 
formal agreement upon all terms of which Greece and the 
EU/EMU were in accord, the answer to the lex monetae question 
would be straightforward.  The Greek legislation would be given 
full effect in the foreign (non-Greek) court just as in the domestic 
(Greek) court.  In such case we would accordingly be faced with a 
situation indistinguishable from that of Venue Scenario 1, above.  
The contract obligation would be dischargeable in NeoD, unless 
Greek and EU/EMU law themselves were challengeable on 
constitutional or international legal grounds sounding in human 
rights and contract-impairment. 
If, by contrast, Greece were to exit the EMU on terms not 
agreed by the two authorities (Greece on the one hand, EU/EMU 
on the other), then our lex monetae question would seemingly be 
unanswerable.  For there would appear, then to be no determinate 
reply to the “which money?” question.  That is because the 
EU/EMU (then including Greece) was and remains the issuer of 
that currency which is named in the contract, while Greece is the 
issuer of that currency into which the contract now has been 
putatively redenominated by Greek legislative fiat. 
In other words, because “which currency?” is precisely the 
question here, and because two authorities each of which has a 
colorable claim to sovereignty over the question at issue would be 
in disagreement, we would not be able to determine what counts 
as tender by reference to the law of the country that issues the 
currency.7  Hence we would move on to . . . 
                                                     
7 It is perhaps worth noting here that this problem seems to be simply a 
straightforward entailment of that ambiguity which afflicts the concept of 
‘sovereignty’ itself in the context of a ‘union’ or ‘federation’ of still putatively 
‘sovereign’ states.  EU and EMU members retain some degree of sovereignty, of 
course, yet also cede certain classic incidents of sovereignty, in a manner not unlike 
that in which U.S. states were understood to have done in the early years of the 
American republic prior to the Civil War. 
 Conundrums stemming from disagreement between states and their union 
over which party bears sovereignty over some particular subject, such as 
currency, do not always lend themselves to straightforward answers in such 
cases.  (That is one of the reasons that eighteenth century British lawyers argued 
that colonial American claims on behalf of ‘divided sovereignty’—the “King in 
Parliament” being the sovereign of England, the “King in the House of Burgesses 
[in the person of the Royal Governor]” being the sovereign of Virginia, etc.—
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4.1.2.4.2.  Law of the Contract 
Next, if there is disagreement between Greece and the EMU 
over the terms of Greece’s exit, hence no determinate lex monetae, 
we fall back to the so-called law of the contract, if such there be.  
That is, if the contract states which law shall govern its own 
interpretation and application, proceed to analyze the case under 
that law.  (Many financial contracts of course stipulate that the law 
of the State of New York shall govern.) 
If the law in question is that of Greece, then we are again back 
to Venue Scenario 1, above.  The foreign court will decide as the 
Greek court would have done.  If the law is not that of Greece, then 
we proceed to iv, below, to apply the apposite jurisdiction’s 
impracticability or impossibility doctrines, depending on whether 
we’re faced with Impediment Scenario A or B.  Finally, if the contract 
does not name any particular body of law as governing—that is, if 
there is no law of the contract—then we fall back to . . . 
4.1.2.4.3.  Conflicts of Law Analysis 
If there is no determinate lex monetae per i above, and the 
contract does not specify any governing body of background law—
any law of the contract—per ii above, then we apply the conflicts 
rules of jurisdiction in which the court entertaining the suit sits to 
determine which law governs.  Once that is determined, we 
proceed in accordance with ii, just above.  That is, if Greek law is 
found applicable, we’re back to Venue Scenario 1 above, and 
otherwise we proceed to iv, below. 
4.1.2.4.4.  Impracticability and Impossibility Doctrine 
Finally, if Greek law turns out not to be applicable law, our 
Greek defendant will likely argue excuse from performance on the 
contract in Euro as distinguished from NeoD, per some variant of 
either the impracticability doctrine, in the case of Impediment Scenario 
A, or the impossibility doctrine, in the case of Impediment Scenario B. 
As it happens, impracticability and impossibility doctrines look 
quite similar from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  I’ll focus on New 
York law, however, because so many financial contracts name it as 
                                                                                                                        
constituted logical absurdities.  ‘No imperium in imperio,’ the ‘unitary sovereign’ 
advocates cried.  Maybe they were right?) 
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the governing law.  In effect, then, we have two scenario 
combinations to consider here—IA2 and IB2. 
I’ll now run through the analysis in both, still staying with our 
present Hypothetical.  The bottom line is that our Greek defendant 
would be unlikely to prevail on an impracticability defense if faced 
with Impediment Scenario A, but might do better with an 
impossibility defense were s/he faced with Impediment Scenario B.  
Impracticability and impossibility analyses, then, run as follows. 
iv.1. Scenario IA2: Impracticability Doctrine in Non-Greek 
Court Under Change Scenario I (Greek exit of EMU) and 
Impediment Scenario A (dramatic depreciation of Neo D 
relative to Euro): 
Contractual impracticability doctrine under New York Law 
follows Section 261 of the Second Restatement of Contracts and 
Section 2–615 of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”).  
Restatement Section 261 states:  
Where, after a contract is made, a party’s performance is 
made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of 
an event the nonoccurrence of which was a basic 
assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to 
render that performance is discharged, unless the language 
or the circumstances indicate the contrary.8 
The UCC provision is similar, though it refers by its terms to 
“sellers” who are parties to “commercial” contracts.9  Captioned 
“Excuse by Failure of Presupposed Conditions”, Section 2–615 
requires a breaching seller who would be excused from performing 
to show (1) some contingency that (2) renders performance 
impracticable while (3) the nonoccurrence of the contingency was 
“a basic assumption upon which the contract was made.”10  
                                                     
8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981).  See also In re Dayton 
Seaside Associates No. 2, L.P., 257 B.R. 123, 139 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting 
Section 261 of the Second Restatement of Contracts); In re Martin Paint Stores, 199 
B.R. 258, 265, 29 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CCR) 647 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 207 B.R. 
57 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (referencing discharge by supervening impracticability as 
provided for by § 261 of the Second Restatement of Contracts). 
9 Official Comment 9, however, notes that the ‘reason’ of the section could 
well apply to non-commercial contracts as well.  See N.Y. U.C.C. § 2–615 (1961). 
10 N.Y. U.C.C. § 2–615 (1961).  
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Under both the Restatement and UCC provisions, the event or 
contingency in question must have been unforeseen, not 
reasonably foreseeable, and beyond the control of the breaching 
party.11  The breaching party also must not have “caused” the 
event or contingency.12  It must also be the case that nothing in the 
contract indicates that the breaching party assumed the risk of such 
event or contingency.13  The event or contingency must also “alter 
the essential nature of the agreement.”14 
Much of this language is of course a bit on the less-than-
altogether-helpful side.  What sorts of impracticability-causing 
event or contingency would be “unforeseeable,” would “alter the 
essential nature of the agreement,” would be “basically” assumed 
in the contract not to occur, and not be a risk “assumed” by the 
party seeking excuse are not immediately obvious on the basis of 
these words and phrases alone.  Hence much rides upon how 
courts interpret and apply the operative terms in the specific 
factual contexts of particular cases. 
In that light, three observations seem most important for our 
purpose (which I take, per our conversation, to be preservation of 
contractual continuity). 
First, increased cost of performance, standing alone, does not 
ordinarily serve as a basis for the impracticability excuse.15  Rather, 
                                                     
11 See, e.g., Cliffstar Corp. v. Riverbend Products, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 81, 84–85 
(W.D.N.Y. 1990) (discussing the standard set forth by Section 2–615 of the Second 
Restatement of Contracts as consisting of several questions, including whether the 
event causing the breach of a contract was foreseeable at the time the contract was 
made and whether such event was due to factors beyond the breaching party’s 
control). 
12 Id.; see also Allen v. City of Yonkers, 803 F. Supp. 679, 709–710 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992) (“The party asserting a defense of impracticability has the burden of 
demonstrating that the event . . . made performance impracticable and that event 
was not the result of that party’s actions or inactions.”).  
13 See, e.g., Dayton Seaside Associates, 257 B.R. at 139 (analyzing the 
“assumption of risk” in the context of Section 2–615 of the Second Restatement of 
Contracts in New York). 
14 See, e.g., Asphalt Intern., Inc. v. Enterprise Shipping Corp., S.A., 667 F.2d 
261, 266 (2d Cir. 1981) (asserting a party’s excusal to perform a contractual duty 
on the grounds of commercial impracticability hinges on several factors including 
whether the intervening event “altered the essential nature of the charter party 
agreement”). 
15 See N.Y. U.C.C. § 2–615 (1961) comment 4; see also Canusa Corp. v. A & R 
Lobosco, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 723, 731 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (elaborating that Section 2–
615 of the Second Restatement of Contracts does not excuse a party’s duty to 
perform on account of increased costs incurred by such performance).   
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the increased cost must stem from an unforeseen, unforeseeable, 
risk-unassumed contingency that alters the “essential nature” of 
the performance.16  Where, as per our Hypothetical, the 
performance in question is simply to pay Euros, the Change that 
sets our case in motion would not seem to affect any “essential 
nature” thereof.  Perhaps an end to the Euro altogether, per Regime 
Change Scenario II, considered below, would be otherwise.  But 
even there, it seems doubtful, as we shall see. 
Second, there have, of course, been multiple occasions in the 
past upon which currencies have been changed—during the 
American Civil War; in the aftermath of the First World War and 
the Russian Revolution, during the 1930s; in the aftermath of the 
Second World War; and following the breakup of the former Soviet 
Union and Soviet bloc.17  Unsurprisingly, each of these events 
occasioned litigation sounding in contract and predicated on 
breaches that defendants sought to excuse by reference to 
impracticability.18  In virtually no such cases, including cases in 
which a new currency was considerably (if not indeed 
dramatically) less valuable than that which it replaced, have 
American courts excused performance.19 
                                                     
16 See Canusa Corp., 986 F. Supp. at 731 n.6; see also Moyer v. City of Little 
Falls, 510 N.Y.S.2d 813, 814–15 (Sup. 1986) (finding excusal of performance of 
contractual duty was justified due to an unforeseeable factor outside of breaching 
party’s control); American Trad. & Production Corp. v. Shell Int. Marine Ltd., 343 
F. Supp. 91, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (discussing the commercial impracticability 
standard set forth in the Second Restatement of Contracts and in the Uniform 
Commercial Code). 
17 See Niall Lenihan, The Legal Implications of the European Monetary Union 
under U.S. and New York Law, at xlv through lxxvii (European Commission 
Economic Paper No. 126, 1998), available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_ 
finance/publications/publication11220_en.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2012) 
(providing an impressively exhaustive discussion of the many cases referenced 
here). 
18 See id. 
19 All such cases but one concerned the Confederate dollar, while the other 
case involved a long-term contract with price explicitly determined by reference 
to an index that turned out seriously to underestimate inflation.  See Aluminum 
Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 70–78 (W.D. Pa. 1980).  It 
perhaps bears noting, however, that these were all cases in which lex monetae 
supported plaintiffs as distinguished from the Scenario here under consideration, 
in which lex monetae is unhelpful owing to disagreement between Greece and the 
EU/EMU over the terms of Greece’s exit.  The distinction does not seem to me to 
make a difference, but perhaps it could be seized upon by a creative defendant’s 
lawyer. 
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Third, and perhaps most importantly of all, New York courts 
do not appear as of yet to have applied the doctrine of 
impracticability outside the context of sale-of-goods contracts 
governed by Article II of the UCC.  In all other circumstances, 
notwithstanding UCC Sec. 2–615 comment 9 cited supra, note 9, 
performances that are not impossible, even if impracticable, must 
be performed, else damages be paid.20  This takes us to . . .  
iv.2. Scenario IB2: Impossibility Doctrine in Non-Greek 
Court Under Change Scenario I (Greek exit of EMU) and 
Impediment Scenario A (depreciation of NeoD relative to 
Euro): 
Contractual impossibility doctrine under New York Law is a 
common law doctrine, by and large identical to impossibility 
doctrine under the laws of other U.S. states as well as those of 
other nations whose legal systems partake of the British common 
law tradition. 
Impossibility excuses a party’s performance under a contract in 
only a very narrowly circumscribed set of circumstances—
circumstances that are but rarely found by New York courts to 
obtain.21  An Act of God—or, next best thing, of government—must 
intervene in such a way as to render performance either literally 
                                                                                                                        
 It also probably bears noting that some esteemed authorities of the past have 
argued that collapse of a currency—as one could, I suppose, imagine happening 
to the NeoD—might under some circumstances warrant a finding of 
impracticability even if courts thus far have declined so to find.  See, e.g., ARTHUR 
LINTON CORBIN, 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1360 (1962); Evsey S. Rashba, Debts in 
Collapsed Foreign Currencies, 54 YALE L. J. 1, 18–30 (1944).  Lenihan, for his part 
begs to differ with Corbin and Rashba.  See Lenihan supra note 17, at xcviii–xcix.  
My colleague Bob Hillman (a New York contract law authority), on the other 
hand, seems somewhat more sympathetic to the Corbin line.  I’ll soon consult 
with another colleague, Bob Summers (of White & Summers) on the UCC, to get 
his take as well. 
20 See GLEN BANKS, NEW YORK CONTRACT LAW Sec. 20:12 (2006) on this point.  
Expected performance will be excused where contingencies frustrate a party’s 
ability to obtain supplies to execute a contract.  Also, where delay or failure of 
performance results from governmental regulation. 
21 See, e.g., Lagarenne v. Ingber, 710 N.Y.S.2d 425 (3d Dep’t 2000) (holding 
that for performance to be excused on grounds of impossibility, the impossibility 
must be occasioned by an unanticipated event, which results in the destruction of 
the subject matter or means of performance such that performance becomes 
objectively impossible). 
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impossible—typically through destruction of the subject matter of 
the contract—or literally illegal.22 
As with impracticability, discussed above, so with 
impossibility, then, economic hardship alone does not count.23  Not 
even bankruptcy does.24  Impossibility really means impossibility—
or illegality. 
For impossibility to be found, it must also be the case that the 
contract has not expressly allocated to either party the risk of that 
event which has putatively rendered performance impossible.25  
Relatedly, the event must not have been foreseeable to the party 
invoking the doctrine.26  Nor can the impossibility in question be 
idiosyncratic to the party invoking it—rather, it must be ‘objective,’ 
such that no other party, either, would have been capable of 
rendering performance after the event in question occurred.27 
As noted above, performance can be counted impossible if 
rendered illegal by law.28  But the law in question must of course 
                                                     
22 See, e.g., Bank of New York v. Tri Polyta Finance B.V., No. 
01Civ.9104(LTS)(DFE), 2003 WL 1960587 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2003) (rejecting 
defendants’ allegation that the economic collapse in Asia and Indonesia had 
rendered their performance of a contract with the plaintiff impossible, and 
holding that lack of funds, “even to the extent of insolvency or bankruptcy,” can 
never excuse contractual performance).  In re Regency Holdings (Cayman), Inc., 
No. 00 CV 8115(HB), 2001 WL 1033429 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2001). 
23 See, e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd., 
86 F. Supp. 2d 244, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating the “absolutely clear” rule 
followed in New York that financial hardship allegedly caused by governmental 
policy does not excuse a party from the performance of its contractual 
obligations). 
24 See, e.g., Barclays Business Credit, Inc., v. Inter Urban Broadcasting of 
Cincinnati, Inc., No. 90 Civ. 2272 (MJL), 1991 WL 258751 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 1991). 
25 See, e.g., United States v. General Douglas MacArthur Senior Village, Inc., 
508 F.2d 377, 381 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that the impossibility doctrine comes into 
play if a contract fails to allocate the risk of an intervening occurrence to either 
party). 
26 See, e.g., Inter-Power of New York, Inc. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 
617 N.Y.S.2d 562, 563–5 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (stating that a plaintiff has no claim 
for impossibility who had notice of an intervening event and could have provided 
for that event in the contract). 
27 See, e.g., Beagle v. Parillo, 498 N.Y.S.2d 177, 178–79 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) 
(concluding that inability of performance is not a defense if inability is personal to 
the performer and not inherent in the task); United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 
F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1966) (emphasizing that inability to perform is an objective, 
not a subjective, standard). 
28 See, e.g., Millgard Corp. v. E.E. Cruz/Nab/Fronier-Kemper, No. 99 Civ. 
2952(LBS), 2004 WL 1900359, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. August 24, 2004) (declaring that 
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have been promulgated after the contract was agreed to29 and 
generally must not have been foreseen by or foreseeable to the 
party invoking impossibility on the new law’s basis.30  
And again, mere hardship worked by the law does not suffice; 
the law must literally render illegal (“objectively impossible”) the 
performance that would be excused.31  Nor will merely temporary 
illegality warrant a finding of impossibility—the illegality in 
question must be of indefinite duration.32 
Bringing these considerations to bear upon the circumstances 
laid out per Impediment Scenario B, we can see that an impossibility 
defense by our Greek defendant might be possible.  Whether it 
would be would depend on the nature of the capital controls 
imposed by the Greek government per that Scenario. 
Were Greece, for example, to prohibit purchase of foreign 
exchange—including now Euro—by Greek nationals altogether, 
we would seem to have a textbook case of Act of God [government]-
wrought impossibility.  All then would ride upon whether the 
contract provided for this particular risk, or if not, then whether 
the risk was in any event reasonably foreseeable by the party 
invoking impossibility—our Greek defendant. 
Were the answer in both cases negative, then our German 
plaintiff would likely have to challenge the Greek legislation itself, 
on some constitutional or treaty-based theory of contract 
                                                                                                                        
contract performance is impossible if it would violate city law); see also 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 457 (1932). 
29 See, e.g., Scanlan v. Devon Systems, Inc., No. 89 CIV 1634 LMM, 2000 WL 
218389, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2000) (mentioning that the impossibility doctrine is 
triggered when a previously legal agreement becomes illegal). 
30 See, e.g., Sagittarius Broadcasting Corp. v. Evergreen Media Corp., 641 
N.Y.S.2d 267, 269 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (noting that change of law rendering 
contract performance impossible must have been unforeseen by invoking party); 
Montgomery-Otsego-Schoharie Solid Waste Management Authority v. County of 
Otsego, 671 N.Y.S.2d 545, 546–48 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (observing that 
impossibility defense is unavailable when the change in law rendering contract 
performance impossible was foreseeable). 
31 See, e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd., 
86 F. Supp. 2d 244, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that financial difficulty even to the 
point of insolvency does not meet the standard for an impossibility defense, even 
where caused by governmental policy).  
32 See, e.g., Scanlan 2000 WL 218389, at *2 (declaring that where impossibility 
of performance is only temporary, impossibility suspends performance but does 
not remove it entirely). 
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impairment, rather than our Greek defendant.  In essence, we 
would be back to Venue Scenario 1, above. 
If, on the other hand, Greece under the new regime employed 
some less onerous form of capital controls, rendering the purchase 
of Euro by our defendant more difficult and more expensive but 
not literally illegal or impossible, the story would be different.  Our 
Greek defendant would remain liable on the contract and 
performance would not be excused.  Again, then, all now will ride 
on that proverbial ‘devil’ who resides in the ‘details’—the Greek 
legislation that institutes what we’ve been calling the Change. 
And that closes discussion of the four possible scenario 
combinations—IA1, IA2, IB1, IB2—under Regime Change Scenario I, 
in which one or more nations leave the EMU, with the EMU 
nevertheless continuing.  Time now has come to consider a 
dissolution of the EMU altogether.  That is Regime Change Scenario 
II. 
Analysis under Regime Change Scenario II, as we shall see, is 
considerably simpler than that under Regime Change Scenario I.  
First, how might contractual continuity come to be implicated? 
Here is what would seem the prototypical Hypothetical.  I’ll 
again lay things out by reference to a change, then a plaintiff and 
defendant whose contractual relation is affected by the change.  I’ll 
keep things as close to our first Hypothetical as possible in order to 
facilitate focus on the one variation introduced here—variation in 
the precise form of the Regime Change that occurs. 
4.2.  Second Hypothetical 
4.2.1.  The Change 
Let us assume first that the EMU simply dissolves, by mutual 
agreement of all parties presently party to that Union.  Assume 
that Greece replaces the Euro with, say, a new national currency, 
the NeoD.  It stipulates some NeoD/Euro exchange rate and 
formally redenominates all pre-existing contracts bearing some 
nexus to Greece—e.g., Greek sovereign bonds, loans to Greek 
nationals, etc.—in NeoD.  Call this “the Change.”  Something like 
this Change would seem to be requisite to contractual continuity’s 
being so much as implicated under Regime Change Scenario II. 
Next, note that, in contrast to the story in Regime Change 
Scenario 1, in this scenario, Greece probably need not adopt any 
particular policy with respect to the post-Change NeoD/Euro 
exchange rate, for the Euro will simply cease to exist.  The one 
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possible exception would be the circumstance in which the terms 
of the EMU’s dissolution were such as to ‘phase out’ the Euro over 
some period, analogously to the way in which the Euro was 
‘phased in’ in the first instance. 
Were that to occur, analysis here during the phase-out would 
be more or less identical to that under Regime Change Scenario I, 
above.  I shall therefore incorporate that analysis by reference here 
for any phase-out period.  Then, once we’re past any phase-out 
period, we have the following. 
Greece will presumably adopt some policy concerning the 
NeoD’s relation to other currencies in the world, even if not, under 
this scenario, to the now non-existent Euro.  There are of course 
several possibilities. 
First, Greece might undertake to peg the NeoD to some other 
currency—say, oh, I don’t know—a NeuDeutscheMark—to keep it 
credible.  This seems unlikely unless Greece intends that the peg be 
adjustable, more on which prospect below.  For adopting a 
nonadjustable peg would deny Greece sufficient monetary policy 
autonomy as to permit repeated periodic de- and/or revaluations, 
which would presumably be among those considerations 
prompting the Change here in the first place. 
A second prospect seems nearly as unlikely.  That would be 
Greece’s aiming to permit a free float of its currency on the ForEx 
markets.  This seems unlikely in light of the new NeoD’s likely 
vulnerability, at least early on, to speculative attack on the ForEx 
markets. 
More likely, then, Greece will aim to operate with either third, 
an adjustable peg, or fourth, a managed float on the ForEx markets.  
Either policy will presumably be conducted by its central bank—
the Bank of Greece, or “BG” (which is still not to be confused with 
the Australian singing group of the 1970s). 
Now, if Greece maintains a non-adjustable peg—again, 
unlikely—it will surely have to employ capital controls as well.  
Some form of capital control or regulation, albeit variably strict 
depending on events in the global capital and ForEx markets, also 
will presumably be necessary in connection with an adjustable peg 
or a managed float. 
Which of these strategies is selected, and how successfully it is 
implemented if it be something other than free float, will bear upon 
subsequent litigation in manners to be noted below. 
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4.2.2.  The Plaintiff and Defendant 
Next, per our Hypothetical, we’ll assume that—oh, I don’t 
know—a German national is owed a contractual debt by the Greek 
Treasury or a Greek national.  The contract denominates the debt 
in Euro, and the German national understands that this is no 
longer possible.  Our plaintiff might nevertheless come to be 
aggrieved, in a manner that implicates law, under various 
conceivable circumstances. 
If one of the following occurs, the Greek Treasury or our Greek 
national might well encounter difficulty in performing on the 
contract in a manner satisfactory to the German plaintiff, even if 
they wish to do so; the legal significance that the difficulty carries 
depends on which one actually occurs. 
 4.2.2.1.  Impediment Scenario A (Colorable Lex Monetae or 
Impracticability Defense) 
We assume Greece has allowed the NeoD to float, either freely 
or in managed fashion, or it maintains an adjustable peg which has 
indeed now been adjusted.  Assume either way that the 
consequence is that NeoD now is worth much less relative to Euro 
than it was at the time of the Change.  In other words, its value is 
now much vitiated by effective inflation of the NeoD itself. 
Our German plaintiff, however, insists on payment at the 
original NeoD/Euro exchange rate at the time of the Change, with 
the current ‘shadow Euro’ value determined by, say, reference to a 
weighted average of the values of all other erstwhile Euro-
currencies.  This will invite invocation of the lex monetae doctrine, 
as well, perhaps, of the commercial impracticability excuse of 
contractual performance by our Greek defendant should the 
German plaintiff demand payment at the original exchange rate in 
non-Greek court. 
4.2.2.2.  Impediment Scenario B (Colorable Impossibility Defense) 
We shall assume that Greece maintains a strict or adjustable 
peg, or manages a float, and to facilitate pursuit of that policy also 
imposes capital controls.  The controls are such, in turn, as to 
prevent ready payment of foreign nationals with NeoD.  If such 
payment is simply rendered more difficult than it otherwise would 
have been, but is not rendered illegal or otherwise literally 
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impossible, then again we are looking at prospective lex monetae or 
impracticability excuse of performance, as in Impediment Scenario A. 
If, on the other hand, capital controls are such as actually to 
render payment with NeoD illegal or impossible, then this will 
invite invocation of impossibility excuse of contractual performance 
should German national demand payment in NeoD, per 
legislatively redenominated terms of the contract, in non-Greek 
court.  Finally, our German plaintiff sues our Greek defendant on 
the contract, seeking payment in NeoD at the original exchange 
rate.  There are then two more sub-scenarios to consider. 
4.2.2.3.  Venue Scenario 1 (Action Brought in Greek Court) 
Assume that the contract action is brought in Greek (domestic) 
court.  In this case the redenomination is again going to be 
recognized, inasmuch as Greek courts apply Greek law.  The only 
question will be whether the defendant may depart from the 
originally legislated exchange rate, which in turn will depend on 
what the legislation itself has to say here.  If the legislation 
stipulates that the original exchange rate remains applicable 
(which seems unlikely if Greek government aims to maintain 
adjustability of currency relative to others), and defendant 
encounters difficulty paying in consequence, then analysis will 
proceed along lines sketched in Venue Scenario 2, below. 
If, on the other hand, legislation provides for payment in 
NeoD, period, with no reference to any particular relative value 
thereof, then defendant will prevail under lex monetae.  
Presumably, however, plaintiff will now aim to appeal to some 
higher court within Greek, EU or global legal systems, perhaps 
challenging the legislation itself on constitutional or cognate treaty 
grounds insofar as it impairs preexisting contractual obligations.  It 
would seem, however, that plaintiff will not likely prevail in such 
case, in view of the weight all nations appear to place upon lex 
monetae. 
4.2.2.4.  Venue Scenario 2 (Action brought in Non-Greek Court) 
Now assume that the contract action is brought in non-Greek 
(foreign), e.g., New York court:  now the court will embark upon a 
multi-step analysis.  First it will determine the lex monetae—the law 
of the sovereign that issues the currency named in the contract.  
For that law, again under the state theory of money that all nations 
(including the United States) appear to uphold, determines what 
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counts as tender in discharge of an obligation denominated in the 
currency issued by that sovereign.  And this is so notwithstanding 
any depreciation on the part of some newly issued currency 
relative to whatever currency it replaces and notwithstanding any 
other body of law named in the contract (i.e., any law of the contract, 
per v, below). 
The only question, then, would be how inflation, per our 
Hypothetical, would affect defendant’s obligation, and this in turn 
would ride, as in Venue Scenario 1 just above, on what the Greek 
legislation itself had to say about the matter.  If the Greek 
legislation said nothing about retention of an initial exchange rate 
for redenomination purposes, plaintiff would again be out of luck, 
as envisaged in 1, just above. The only recourse then would be 
constitutional-like challenge to the legislation itself. 
On the other hand, if the Greek legislation did provide for 
revaluation of redenominated sums in a manner that continued to 
reflect the initial exchange rate stipulated in the legislation, then 
defendant would wish to appeal to impracticability or 
impossibility doctrine as discussed above.  That would raise the 
question of which jurisdiction’s such doctrine was applicable.  
Hence we would turn to . . . 
4.2.2.4.1.  Law of the Contract 
First we determine the so-called law of the contract, if such there 
be.  That is, if the contract states which law shall govern its own 
interpretation and application, we proceed to analyze the 
impracticability or impossibility question under that law.  (Many 
financial contracts of course stipulate that the law of the State of 
New York shall govern.) 
If the law in question is that of Greece, then we are again back 
to Venue Scenario 1, above.  If the law is not that of Greece, then we 
proceed to vii, below, to apply the apposite jurisdiction’s 
impracticability or impossibility doctrines, depending on whether 
we’re faced with Impediment Scenario A or B.  Finally, if the contract 
does not name any particular body of law as governing—that is, if 
there is no law of the contract—then we fall back to . . . 
4.2.2.4.2.  Conflicts of Law Analysis 
If there is no governing body of background law per v above, 
then apply the conflicts rules of jurisdiction in which the court 
entertaining the suit sits to determine which law governs.  Once 
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that is determined, proceed in accordance with v, above.  That is, if 
Greek law is found applicable, we’re back to 1 above, and 
otherwise we proceed to vii, below. 
4.2.2.4.3.  Impracticability or Impossibility Defenses 
Finally, if Greek law turns out not to be applicable law apart 
from defining the currency, and that law in turn, per its 
redenomination provision, appears to suggest that redenomination 
occurs strictly in keeping with the first-stated exchange rate 
between the new NeoD and the old Euro, and the NeoD in the 
meanwhile has significantly dropped in value, our Greek 
defendant might argue excuse from performance per some variant 
of either the impracticability doctrine, in the case of Impediment 
Scenario A, or the impossibility doctrine, in the case of Impediment 
Scenario B.  Analysis will then proceed as laid out above in 
connection with each doctrine. 
5. A SPECIAL CASE?  THE NEW YORK GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW 
Ah, but wait.  What about the 1997 Amendments to the New 
York General Obligations Law?  As the reader likely knows, New 
York amended its general obligations law in 1997 to ensure 
continuity of contract after the Euro, pursuant to the EMU’s 
coming into being, replaced the European Currency Unit 
(“ECU”).33  That was an important measure to take, because many 
contracts—particularly derivative and other financial contracts—
are either entered into in the State of New York, name New York 
law as the law of the contract, or both. 
In essence, the 1997 Amendments provide that if a subject or 
medium of payment of a contract, security, or financial instrument 
is the pre-Euro ECU, the Euro will count as a commercially 
reasonable substitute and substantial equivalent.  The Euro 
accordingly may be used to determine the value of the ECU at the 
time of payment, or may be tendered, at an exchange rate specified 
in or calculable in accordance with regulations adopted by the 
Council of the European Union. 
                                                     
33 See S. Memo. In Supp 220–5049, Reg. Sess., at 2299 (N.Y. 1997) (codified at 
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5–1601–1604 (McKinney 1999)) (detailing New York 
law guaranteeing continuity of contract following the replacement of the ECU 
with the Euro).  
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None of this would seem to change the analysis provided 
above.  There are two reasons for this.  The first, narrower reason is 
that the amendment to the General Obligations law refers by terms 
to contracts denominated in ECU, providing in essence that the 
Euro now is, for all commercially practical intents and purposes, 
the ECU.  It says nothing about, nor does it appear in any way to 
contemplate, any prospective retreat from the Euro (or ECU) to 
distinct national currencies. 
The second, broader reason is that the amendment to the 
General Obligations law appears to have been meant simply to 
codify and make plain in one place something that already would 
have been legally true—namely, that per the lex monetae of the 
EMU, which New York and all other jurisdictions already would 
have accepted per the state theory of money that predominates across 
the world, the ECU has now been officially replaced by the Euro.  
The amendment accordingly added nothing of substance, but 
merely declared in an up-front, statutory fashion what was already 
true as a matter of common law. 
6. CONCLUSION: KEEPING IT UNREAL 
I hope I have managed to render more tractable that complex, 
multilayered problem that could be occasioned by what has 
become, alas, more than a mere abstract possibility.34  While I do 
not believe fundamental EMU regime change to be likely—
desirable as I believe at least one temporary change to that regime 
would be—I do think it helpful to think through in advance what 
legal consequences would be apt to follow were such change to 
occur. 
Contingency planning of this sort not only assures more 
orderly, less panicked responses in the event that the contemplated 
eventuality does occur; it also, in forestalling panic, actually lessens 
the likelihood of the eventuality itself.  For as we know well from 
hundreds of years of financial history, financial and money 
markets are one realm in which prophecies, dire or exuberant, are 
apt to prove self-fulfilling. 
 
                                                     
34 The reader is hereby reminded that the Appendix immediately following 
reduces all of the analysis to a conveniently tractable ‘flowchart’ form. 
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APPENDIX: FLOW CHART SUMMARY  
(Read Top to Bottom, then Left to Right) 
Regime Change I: Exit by One or More Economic and Monetary 
Union Members (“EMU”)—Country Greece. 
Hypothetical:  Contract in Euros, Non-Greek Party Prefers 
Payment in Euros. 
 
Impediment A: New Greek Currency 
depreciates.  
Greek Defendant pays in new Greek 
currency. 
Impediment B: Cap Controls Prevent 
Euro Purchase.  
Greek Defendant unable to pay in Euro. 
Venue 1: Suit in 
Greek Court. 
Venue 2: Suit in 
NY Court. 
Venue 1: Suit in 
Greek Court. 




Seek Lex Monetae. Defendant 
prevails. 
Seek Lex Monetae. 
 If Greece/EMU 
split amicably, Lex 
Monetae is Greek.  
And…  
If Greek, Defendant 
prevails. 
 If Greece/EMU split 
amicably, Lex 
Monetae is Greek.  
And… 
If Greek, Defendant 
prevails. 
 If split is not 
amicable, There’s 
no Lex Monetae. 
 If split is not 
amicable, no Lex 
Monetae. 
 If no Lex Monetae, 
seek Law of 
Contract: 
If Greek, Defendant 
prevails. 
If not Greek, go to 
bottom line. 
 If no Lex Monetae, 
seek Law of 
Contract 
If Greek, Defendant 
prevails. 
If not Greek, to 
bottom line. 
 If no Law of 
Contract, 
Conflicts Analysis. 
If Greek, Defendant 
prevails: 
 If no Law of 
Contract, 
Conflicts Analysis. 
If Greek, Defendant 
prevails: 








                                                     
35 Note that at any point herein at which Greece prevails, the plaintiff 
may nonetheless challenge new Greek legislation itself on constitutional 
or treaty-based grounds for impairment of contract.  That might be 
difficult in view of lex monetae, but . . . . 
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Regime Change II: Dissolution of Economic and Monetary Union 
Hypothetical: Contract in Euros, Non-Greek Party Prefers 
Payment in Greek Currency at Initial Exchange Rates. 
 
Impediment A: New Greek Currency 
depreciates:  
Greek Defendant prefers payment at 
current rate. 
Impediment B: Cap Controls Prevent 
Payout: 
Greek Defendant is unable to pay at 
all. 
Venue 1: Suit in 
Greek Court. 
Venue 2: Suit in NY 
Court. 
Venue 1: Suit 
in Greek Court. 






Seek Lex Monetae; Defendant 
prevails. 
Seek Lex Monetae:  
Defendant 
prevails.36 
Lex Monetae is 
Greek. 










Hence Venue 1 
analysis. 
 
 Defendant prevails. 
 
                                                     
36 Note again that at any point herein at which Greece prevails, the 
plaintiff may nonetheless challenge new Greek legislation itself on 
constitutional or treaty-based grounds for impairment of contract.  That 
might be difficult in view of lex monetae, but . . . .  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
